Gernot Müller

How effectively does defense spending translate into military capability? We introduce the military multiplier, defined as the percentage increase in military equipment generated by an additional dollar of defense spending. We show that the response of the relative price of defense goods to military buildups is a sufficient statistic for this multiplier: the stronger the price response, the smaller the multiplier. Time-series evidence for the United States shows that defense-sector prices rise sharply in response to military buildups in the post–Cold War period, implying a short-run multiplier of about 0.7, compared with values exceeding 1 during the Cold War. We develop and calibrate a multi-sector network model of the U.S. economy showing that this decline reflects high effective capital reallocation costs associated with the shrinking industrial base.

Using historical income and wealth data, we show that war reduces inequality: the top-1% income share falls by 20% and the top-1% wealth share by 10%. We measure three key drivers of inequality-capital destruction, taxation, and inflation-in the data and quantify their role with a Heterogeneous Agent New Keynesian (HANK) model. Destruction depresses profits and thus top incomes. Taxation primarily influences wealth dynamics, while inflation has little effect on top shares, but reduces indebtedness among poorer households. We validate our findings using new data on inequality across German towns in World War 2 and cross-country data on profits.